Experimental evidence of reputation management under threat of gossip--论文代写范文精选

51Due论文代写网精选paper代写范文：“Experimental evidence of reputation management under threat of gossip ” 对年轻的孩子表现出明显的行为观察，研究抑制反应的可能性，相比之下,我们假设一个成年人的冲动，往往被负面社会的风险信息所替代。这个假设的初步测试称为独裁者游戏。自私的分配往往会变得更频繁。鉴于在这篇paper代写范文的研究中，匿名和识别的重要性,我们决定研究语言的作用，在促进个体演员的身份和行为信息的传播，调查两个变量对利他行为的影响。下面的paper代写范文进一步论述。

Introducion
  The children in the observational study were too young to show much behavioural inhibition in response to the likelihood of tattling (although they did occasionally desist from an activity if directly threatened with tattling). In contrast, we hypothesized that an adult individual’s selfish impulses are often inhibited by the risk that negative social information about his or her actions will be transmitted to absent third parties. As a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we employed an economic experiment called the dictator game (Camerer, 2003, ch. 2; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), in which each participant is asked to divide a monetary endowment between themselves and one other participant. 

  Previous findings with the dictator game suggest that even in anonymous settings, equitable allocations are often the mode (Camerer, 2003, Table 2.4). However, selfish allocations tend to become more frequent as the “social distance” (or social isolation) between players increases, in highly anonymized experimental paradigms (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). Conversely, Bohnet and Frey (1999) found that dictators who could visually identify their recipients were less selfish with their allocations than dictators who could not identify their recipients, and selfishness decreased further when recipients were required to disclose their names. Even showing generic eyespots on a computer while dictators are making their decisions (Haley & Fessler, 2005) – or in a naturalistic setting, displaying an image of a pair of eyes rather than an image of flowers above a canteen “honesty box” (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006) – can significantly increase allocations. The possibility of identifying the donor also has a strong effect on generosity. Burnham (2003) found that dictators’ allocations were at similarly high levels – significantly higher than in an anonymized control – (i) when they were shown a photo of the recipient, and (ii) when they were told that their own photo would be shown to the recipient.

  Given the importance of anonymity and identification in this research, we decided to investigate the role of language – that is, gossip – in facilitating the identification of individual actors and the spread of information about their actions. One of us (JP) used a modified dictator game to investigate the effect of two variables on altruistic behaviour (see Piazza & Bering, forthcoming). The first variable (reputational concern) indicated whether or not a third party could identify the participant. This variable was manipulated using a confederate. Before being instructed about the dictator game, participants either did or did not meet and disclose personally identifying information (e.g., their name, place of study, place of residence) to a female confederate in private. 

  The second variable (threat of gossip) indicated whether or not participants were told that the person directly affected by their economic decision (the receiver) would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was the confederate with whom they had disclosed personally identifying information. For others, this third party could not identify them. The experiment thus had a 2 x 2 (reputational concern x threat of gossip) factorial, between-subjects design with allocation scores (i.e., number of tokens allocated to the receiver) as the main dependent measure. 

  The game itself entailed having participants unilaterally distribute an endowment of ten tokens between themselves and an anonymous second party (the Receiver). Each individual token represented a chance to have one’s name entered into a lottery drawing to win ₤100. Participants were instructed that they would never meet the Receiver and that they were free to distribute the endowment however they wished – the only constraint was that the distribution total had to equal 10. Measures were also taken to reduce the motivation for building a reputation with the experimenter, in that participants’ economic decisions were written down and enclosed in opaque envelopes to conceal them from the experimenter.

  The results were that participants who received the threat of gossip variable were significantly more generous with their allocations to the Receiver (see Table 2, and Piazza & Bering, forthcoming). However, simple-effects analysis revealed that this was only the case for participants who had previously disclosed personally identifying information to the recipient of the gossip (the third party). When the recipient of the gossip was unable to identify the participant, participants in this condition were no more generous with their allocations than control participants (i.e., participants without the threat of gossip). (paper代写)

  This suggests that the threat of gossip can promote generous economic decisions, but only when an individual’s reputation is placed at risk by the threat. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that selective pressure to present the self strategically (i.e., to promote a rewarding reputation) increased during human evolution with the emergence of language. This was accomplished by inhibiting selfish behaviour in order to prevent negative social information from being disseminated to absent third parties (i.e., potential mates and coalition partners). In the experiment, the threat of gossip appeared to inhibit selfish behaviour and encourage prosocial behaviour, but only when the threat was backed by real concerns about one’s reputation. When the recipient of the gossip could identify the participant, the gossip prime led to a significant increase in allocations.(paper代写)

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