The Effects of Youth Employment--论文代写范文精选

许多联邦、州和地方政策试图支持个人的就业市场前景,包括公共就业和就业补贴项目。在许多情况下,这些项目重点鼓励青年就业，通常是夏季尤其是青年就业。全国城市项目为青年提供暑期工作。下面的paper代写范文进行详述。

Abstract 
Programs to encourage labor market activity among youth, including public employment programs and wage subsidies like the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, can be supported by three broad rationales. They may: (1) provide contemporaneous income support to participants; (2) encourage work experience that improves future employment and/or educational outcomes of participants; and/or (3) keep participants “out of trouble.” We study randomized lotteries for access to New York City’s Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP), the largest summer youth employment program in the U.S., by merging SYEP administrative data on 294,580 lottery participants to IRS data on the universe of U.S. tax records. In assessing the three rationales, we find that: (1) SYEP participation causes average earnings and the probability of employment to increase in the year of program participation, with modest crowdout of other earnings and employment; (2) SYEP participation causes a moderate decrease in average earnings for three years following the program and has no impact on college enrollment; and (3) SYEP participation decreases the probability of incarceration and decreases the probability of mortality, which has important and potentially pivotal implications for analyzing the net benefits of the program.

Introduction 
Many federal, state, and local policies attempt to support individuals’ labor market prospects, including public employment and subsidized employment programs. In many cases, these programs focus on encouraging youth employment — often summer youth employment in particular. City programs across the country provide youth with summer jobs — the fifty most populous cities in the country have all had summer youth employment programs in the last five years — and the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) subsidizes employment of summer youth employees. Expanded employment programs have also been used during times of high unemployment; for example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided states with $1.2 billion to give disadvantaged youth access to employment and training during the Great Recession, with a particular focus on summer employment (Bellotti et al. 2010). As youth unemployment remains elevated following the Great Recession, youth employment programs have received increased scrutiny from policy-makers. 

While literature typically finds that other (i.e. non-summeremployment) active labor market programs for youth have costs that outweigh their benefits (Stanley, Katz, and Krueger 1998; Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999; Lalonde 2003), summer youth employment has “received relatively little attention from program evaluators” (Lalonde 2003, p. 532). Programs to support summer employment are justified with various rationales. One rationale is that summer employment could provide income support to youth (and their families) through wages earned in the program. The website of the New York City (NYC) Department of Youth and Community and Development (DYCD), which runs the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) that we analyze in this paper, states that SYEP aims to “provide supplemental income to aid low income families.” 1 Similarly, stimulus efforts like ARRA summer youth spending aim to increase contemporaneous net earnings and employment (among other goals). 

A second rationale is that summer work experience could improve future employment outcomes, perhaps particularly for disadvantaged youth who would otherwise have low summer employment rates. For example, summer employment might lead to increases in human capital — the NYC DYCD also states that SYEP aims to“develop youth skills.”2 Summer employment could also raise future earnings by acting as a signal to potential future employers, or through the channel of educational attainment, if work experience translates into greater schooling. A third rationale for such programs is that they could help to keep youth involved in socially productive activities or “out of trouble.”3 Keeping youth out of trouble during the summer could help them avoid dangerous activities and could have benefits such as decreasing incarceration or mortality rates. We investigate the empirical support for these three rationales by analyzing the SYEP program in the years 2005 to 2008, inclusive. 

During these years, SYEP provided summer jobs to NYC youth aged 14 to 21, paid by the NYC government at a total cost of $236 million. 4 Each year, SYEP received more applications than the number of SYEP jobs available. In the face of this excess demand, SYEP randomly allocated spots in the program to applicants by lottery. We compare the outcomes of individuals who participate in SYEP because they were randomly selected to receive a job through SYEP, to the outcomes of individuals randomly not selected. We examine the effect of SYEP on observable outcomes suited to assess each of the rationales for summer youth employment programs. 

We link SYEP administrative data on these lottery winners and losers to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative data on the universe of U.S. federal tax data; to New York State (NYS) Department of Corrections and Community Services (DOCCS) administrative data on individuals incarcerated in NYS; and to NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOH) administrative data on causes of death in New York City. In the four years of lotteries we study, there were 294,580 SYEP applications subject to the lottery, of which 164,977 won the lottery and 129,603 lost the lottery. This context provides a particularly promising setting for studying a youth employment program. 

First, the large scale of the program, the random assignment, and the accurate data allow us to estimate precise causal effects, not only on earnings, the employment rate, and college enrollment, but also on rare outcomes including mortality and incarceration. Our sample sizes are at least an order of magnitude (and in many cases two orders of magnitude) larger than the sample sizes of other randomized studies. The ability to look precisely at mortality, which other studies have not been able to observe, will prove particularly interesting since it will have important implications for the benefits of the program and offer a new take on previous results. The data allow us to estimate effects up to almost a decade after program participation. 

Second, the IRS and DOCCS administrative data allow us to examine a wide variety of outcomes, including contemporaneous and subsequent earnings, earnings by industry, college enrollment, incarceration, and mortality. Third, NYC SYEP is the largest summer youth employment program in the U.S. and therefore represents a central, recent case study of U.S. summer youth employment programs and an important example of youth employment programs more generally. We find that SYEP participation increases earnings and employment in the year individuals are employed through the program. In a baseline specification, we estimate that in the year of SYEP participation, SYEP raises average earnings through the program by $1,085.34, lowers other earnings by a modest $208.87, and therefore raises net earnings in the year of participation by $876.26. Thus, crowdout of other earnings was 19.24 percent of the SYEP transfer in this year. We also estimate that, on net, SYEP raises the probability of having any job by 71 percentage points in the year of the participation, with only a five percentage point decrease in the probability of having a non-SYEP job. At the same time, we do not find that youth employment has a positive effect on subsequent earnings or on college enrollment. 

In each of the three years following SYEP participation, we estimate that SYEP participation causes a modest decrease in earnings of around $100 per year. This effect is driven by those who had worked prior to SYEP participation and by those in the upper half of the earnings distribution; meanwhile, SYEP participation has an insignificant impact on subsequent earnings among WOTC-eligible individuals. Starting in the fourth year following SYEP participation, we find insignificant impacts of SYEP participation on earnings. We also find that SYEP has no impact on college enrollment, with an extremely precise 95-percent confidence interval that rules out a positive or negative effect greater than one one-hundredth of a year of college during the period we examine. It is notable that even for this young group with typically little prior job experience, and even during the Great Recession period that we examine separately, an employment program did not provide a path to greater future earnings.(paper代写)

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