The Cognitive Actor And mind of the actor--论文代写范文精选

依靠现有的理论认知架构，讨论了认知科学是跨学科的。通过认知体系结构的概述，详细描述了内部模块，作为分析功能指导原则，促进理解新的认知架构。下面的paper代写范文进行论述。

Abstract
  THE social actor, as explained in the previous chapter, is concerned with the social construction of the world around him and how this world can be represented in the mind of the actor. In other words, the actor is not only physically, but also socially and culturally embedded (or situated) in the society. On the other hand, the cognitive actor, despite the fact that it is connected with the outside world by systems of perception and action, is more concerned with internal representations and operations on those representations. 

  We have argued in the previous chapter that the social level can be characterised as social representations, e.g. as social structures, social constructs, and that social representations are symbols in the mind of the cognitive actor that can undergo the same operations as any other symbol or representation in the mind of the actor. In this chapter we focus on cognitive scienceespecially on the cognitive architectureand leave the social actor alone. The implementation of the social construct as a representation will be described in the next chapter. In chapter 1, we asked ourselves what kind of an actor would be capable of handling signs, relations and social constructs. 

  In this chapter, we argue that such an actor should have a cognitive architecture, i.e. be cognitive plausible, in order to handle representations such as signs, relations and social constructs. We argue for the need to adopt theories of cognition and cognitive architectures. However, we neither give a complete reconstruction of the theory of cognition, nor present an extensive philosophical and in-depth cognitive discussion on what precisely cognitive architectures and their complex domain of applications are. Instead, we rely on existing theories of cognition about cognitive architectures; theories that have been thoroughly tested and have thereby proven their robustness over the last two decades. We start with section 4.1 that discusses cognitive science as an interdisciplinary eld in which cognitive architectures originate. 

  We give an overview of the cognitive architecture in section 4.2. Specically, we consider two cognitive architectures as good candidates for implementing a cognitive plausible actor. In section 4.3, we elaborate the selection of one of these architectures1ACT-Rthat best suits our research purposes. In section 4.4, we detail the internal modules and mechanisms of ACT-R, because its analysis functions as a guideline for the modelling and facilitated comprehension of a new cognitive architecture, i.e. RBot (see chapter 5). In the nal sectionsection 4.5we discuss issues concerning ACT-R, and the changes or additions that we make to the principles of ACT-R in order to create a platform of cognitive actors that is suitable for our simulation demonstrated in chapter 6. 

 Cognitive science 
  Cognitive science is a multi-disciplinary eld that draws on articial intelligence, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. The advocates of each discipline are interested in studying the brain and mind. They see the brain/mind as a complex system that receives, stores, retrieves, transforms, and transmits information (Stillings, Weisler, Chase, Feinstein, Gareld, & Rissland, 1995). Cognitive scientists claimin opposition to the behaviourists or ecologiststhat the mind is more than a simple stimulus-response mechanism, i.e. the mind is a complex construction or architecture that interprets the world and cannot be explained by physical or behavioural laws alone. 

  The presence of cognitive interpretation (mechanisms) in the mind of the actor is expressed by Pylyshyn in the following statement: The critical aspect of the connection between stimulus conditions and subsequent behaviorthe aspect that must be incorporated in the theoretical account if the latter is to capture the systematicity of the person's behavioris that it is (a) the environment or the antecedent event as seen or interpreted by the subject, rather than as described by physics, that is the systematic determiner of actions; and (b) actions performed with certain intentions, rather than behaviors as described by an objective natural science such as physics, that enter into behavioral regularities. (Pylyshyn, 1984, p. 9) 

  Algorithms, assumed to be present in the mind, produce these new symbols out of existing symbols. For instance, an addition of 9 and 8 creates a new symbol 17. However, algorithms are formal operations on symbols and are different from the representational relations between symbols and what they stand for. This difference is in the level of description, a topic that was discussed in both chapters 1, and 2. We made a distinction in several levels of description, from physical to social. In the next section, we continue the discussion about the levels of description, but for the time being leave the emphasis on the mind of the individual. 

  Levels of description First of all, we want to recall the levels of description of Dennett (1978), discussed in chapter 2. Dennett distinguishes a rational levela level that contains a belief-system in relation to the actor's goals, a functional levela level with descriptions in the terms of functions of the system, and a physical levela level that describes the physical properties of functional components. Following up Dennett, many other cognitive scientists/psychologists have acknowledged that the mind cannot simply be described by a physical or rational level alone. Anderson (1990), see table 4.1, provides a nice comparison between the levels of description assigned by various cognitive scientists. Cognitive scientists are not interested much in the physical (or biological) level, because the details of the physical level are still unclear. 

  In studying Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), often the rational or intentional level is considered well-suited for describing (behavioural) systems, e.g. the game theory applied in economics or the rational (logical) agent (cf. Wooldridge, 2000) in MAS. In this dissertation, we pay attention to the intentional level, because we incorporate goals and interaction with the environment/social world as well. However, we also want to incorporate the functional levelalgorithm and implementation levelsbesides the rational or intentional level. In other words, an actor should contain (1) representations, (2) cognitive mechanisms or algorithms, and (3) functional mechanisms5 , because we argue that human behaviour cannot solely be explained by simplied stimulus-response behaviour. (paper代写)

  A design or a model in the form of a cognitive architecture is a proven methodology in unfolding the essentials of human behaviour in a more accurate way than that provided by the behaviourist approach. The cognitive architecture is based on the fundamental view that in cognitive science an intelligent system is not completely homogeneous, i.e. it must consist of a number of functional subsystems, or modules, that cooperate to achieve intelligent information processing and behaviour. This view is supported by empirical results in cognitive psychology (Stillings et al., 1995). This chapter primarily focuses on the classical approach of cognition. However there are also two other areasconnectionism and embodied cognition within cognitive science that deserve attention. For instance, ACT-R, as discussed in this chapter, applies connectionism-like assumptions in its associative memory. In the case of embodied cognition, we adopt the ideas of the subsumption (architecture) of behaviours for constructing the awareness of social situations. 4.1.(paper代写)
 
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