Why Imitation Matters--论文代写范文精选

  从模仿研究和证据上来思考,感知和行动空间共享，有更高的认知能力和区别，这些结果的手段,引导有意行为以及模仿学习的方式。下面的paper代写范文继续讲述。

Introduction
  In light of the contributions from a variety of disciplinary perspectives that we have surveyed, the importance of imitation can be described in both substantive and methodological terms. Here we briefly sketch how the study of imitation illuminates substantive issues about the links between perception and action and between self and other; the modularity of mind; the relationships among various levels of description of minds in society; the relationship between genetic endowment and social environment in forming human minds; the relationships between cultural evolution, in which imitation is arguably the primary copying mechanism, and biological evolution, which gave rise to the capacity for imitation in the first place. 

  We conclude by suggesting that the study of imitation illustrates promising methodologies for interactive collaboration among the cognitive and social sciences and philosophy. The study of imitation sheds light on two relationships that are central to understanding minds in general and human minds in particular: the relationship between perception and action and the relationship between self and other. The following paragraph sketches our view of how it does so, drawing on suggestions in various chapters. While there is plenty of room for disagreement about the details, it is hard to doubt the relevance of imitation to these issues. 

  Hypotheses about the control, imitative, and simulative functions of the mirror system, and evidence from imitation studies for ideomotor and common coding theories, suggest that perception and action share a fundamental information space that is preserved as higher cognitive capacities Distinctions are built on it (see Gallese, vol. 1, ch. 3; Decety and Chaminade, vol. 1, ch. 4; Prinz, vol. 1, ch. 5; Hurley, vol. 1, ch. 7; and Meltzoff, vol. 2, ch. 1). The distinction between results and the means to those results, on which goal-directed, perceptually guided intentional action as well as imitative learning depend, emerges as a flexible articulation of this shared processing (see Rizzolatti, vol. 1, ch. 1). However, perception remains fundamentally enactive, in a way that challenges orthodox views of perception and action as separate and of perception as motivationally inert (see Kinsbourne, vol. 2, ch. 7; see also and cf. Noe¨, in press). 

  The intersubjectivity characteristic of human beings, the basis for their innate capacity to understand and empathize with one another, is enabled as a specialization of such enactive perception. Perceiving your action enactively, in a way that immediately engages my own potential similar action, thus enables me to understand, or to imitate, your action. Shared processing of the actions of other and self is a special aspect of the shared processing of perception and action. The problem of ‘‘knowledge’’ of other minds looks quite different from this perspective. It is not so much that intersubjective information bridges an informational gap between self and other as that the self–other distinction is imposed on the fundamental information space that self and other share. 

  As Gordon puts it, the first person is multiplied—though care is needed over whether this multiplication is understood at the level of subpersonal information, at the personal level, or both (see and cf. Gallese, vol. 1, ch. 3; W. Prinz, vol. 1, ch. 5; Hurley, vol. 1, ch. 7; Meltzoff, vol. 2, ch. 1; and Gordon, vol. 2, ch. 3). Simulation theories of mind reading can be right about shared processing for self and other with respect to this fundamental intersubjectivity, even if more advanced aspects of mind reading require theorizing in ways enabled by language. Imitation is also prime territory in which to investigate issues about the modularity of mind and the relationships among different levels of description: neural, functional, personal, social, and cultural. Does the study of imitation support views of cognition as emerging from layers of dynamic perceptual-motor skills scaffolded by social and cultural environments (horizontal modularity), rather than as embodied in a central module that interfaces between perception and action (vertical modularity; see Hurley, 1998, 2001; Brooks, 1999)? What does the common coding of perception and action in imitation imply about the modularity of mind? How do different levels of description of imitation constrain one another? 

  How, for example, would shared subpersonal processing for self and other be reflected in personal-level understanding of others? What do neural mirror systems imply about imitation and mind reading? Why do some creatures have neural mirror systems but not imitative capacities, and what more is needed for imitation? What do hypotheses about the functional subpersonal architecture that enables imitation imply about neural structures and function (or vice versa)? About the development and nature of our capacities as persons to understand other persons? Do empathy and mind reading at the personal level depend on simulation? Is simulation, in effect, offline imitation? Is simulation a personal-level rival to theorizing, or a subpersonal mechanism, or both? 

  Does cultural evolution depend primarily on blind, automatic mirroring mechanisms or on deliberative, goal-driven, selective imitation? The study of imitation can contribute to our understanding of broad theoretical issues, such as those between nativists and empiricists about the relative contributions of genetic and environmental influences to psychology and language. These issues arise at various levels in the study of imitation. Why does a special capacity to learn imitatively from social environments evolve genetically—and why so rarely? What does imitation reveal about the relationship between human nature and other animals? Is the correspondence between perception and action that imitation exploits innate, as Meltzoff suggests, or is it acquired in cultural environments, as Heyes suggests? Does the location of mirror neurons in Broca’s area suggest that imitative learning plays more of a role in language acquisition than nativists about language acquisition allow? 

  Does imitation structure linguistic competence in some way as well as prompting performance (assuming that a competence/performance distinction is viable)? Do the recombinant ends-means and sequential-hierarchical structures and the self–other parity found in imitative action provide a basis for syntactic structure and shared meanings in linguistic action? If so, should we understand this foundation in evolutionary or developmental terms, or both? If not, what is the relationship between language and imitation? (See Iacoboni, Arbib, Byrne, Pepperberg, Pickering, Donald, Christiansen.) More generally, imitation is a critical locus for understanding the ecology of human cognition and norms: the dynamic interactions between cognitive processes and sociocultural processes. 

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