New York's Summer Youth Employment--论文代写范文精选

我们发现SYEP降低后，三年SYEP参与,对未来就业的概率几乎没有影响,而且没有对大学入学人数产生影响。我们没有发现证据表明，SYEP成功提高后续收入,就业或教育。下面的paper代写范文进行阐述。

Abstract
We investigate the effects of summer employment on youth by analyzing the New York City Summer Youth Employment Program, which randomly selected applicants for access to the program. We can now revisit the three broad rationales for programs that support summer youth employment: (1) transferring to youth; (2) raising future earnings, employment, or education; and (3) keeping youth “out of trouble.” We find support for the first rationale. SYEP increases contemporaneous employment and net earnings and transfers net income to participants. In the year of program participation, we find that SYEP raises earnings substantially, with only modest (19.24 percent) crowdout of other earnings that is small relative to many results in other literature.57 Overall, SYEP leads to a substantial and significant increase in earnings when we consider the sum of earnings in the year of SYEP participation along with the subsequent years— albeit with quite substantial crowdout (54.02 percent) over Years 0 to 4 combined. 

We find that SYEP lowers subsequent earnings for three years following SYEP participation, has little impact on the probability of future employment, and has no impact on college enrollment. Thus, we find no evidence that SYEP succeeds in raising subsequent earnings, employment, or education; on balance, we find the opposite. The impact on subsequent earnings is small relative to likely lifetime income, but it is substantial relative to the size of the SYEP transfer (36.13 percent of the transfer). It is notable that even for this young group with little or no prior job experience — and even during the Great Recession — an employment program does not provide a path to greater future earnings. Finally, we find evidence that SYEP succeeds in the goal of keeping youth “out of trouble.” SYEP leads to a 0.10 percentage point decrease in the rate of incarceration in state prison, which is small in percentage point terms but substantial relative to the baseline rate of 0.95 percent. 

Among those 19 and older at the time of SYEP participation — the group for which we are able to observe essentially all incarceration episodes for crimes committed at the time of SYEP participation or later — the reduction in incarceration is quite substantial (0.46 percentage points) and over half of the baseline incarceration rate. Paralleling the effect on incarceration, SYEP reduces the mortality rate by 0.08 percentage points, which is again small in percentage point terms but large relative to the baseline (0.38 percentage points). Combined with the number of individuals in SYEP, the mortality point estimate implies that 85.93 lives were saved by SYEP in the time window of the program that we analyze. While SYEP has a modest negative effect on subsequent earnings for three years — which may at first appear to contrast with the reduction in incarceration and mortality — the reduction in incarceration and mortality parallels the typically positive effects on earnings found in the lower quantiles of the earnings distribution, which also suggest that SYEP improves the left tail of outcomes. These effects on mortality are very important in a cost-benefit analysis. 

The earnings effects that we estimate prove to be modest relative to the program’s benefits from reduced mortality. The value of a statistical life is estimated to be in the range of $9 million for prime-age workers (Viscusi and Aldy 2003, in $2013); if SYEP saved 85.93 lives, this would imply benefits of $773.38 million. It is clear that the point estimates imply that the mortality benefits will be large within any plausible range of the value of life.58 Meanwhile, the reduction in incarceration has more modest aggregate benefits: combining Donohue’s (2009) estimates of the per-crime cost of an Index I crime with our estimates of the reduction in incarceration, we find that the reduction in incarceration due to the SYEP program in years 2005 to 2008 corresponds to a $4.66 million net benefit to society using Donohue’s upperend estimates of the benefits per crime, and a $1.03 million net benefit using Donohue’s lower-end estimates.59 It is not possible for us to determine with certainty whether the benefits of the program outweigh the costs, as there are many costs and benefits we do not observe. 

For example, we do not observe the value of the goods produced by SYEP participants, the costs of SYEP participants’ out-of-pocket expenses from participating in the program (such as commuting or childcare), the social cost of crimes not captured in the incarceration data (such as future incarceration episodes), the cost of other public programs that could have been affected by SYEP participation, and so on. Nonetheless, it is clear that the $773.38 million in mortality benefits is substantial compared to plausible estimates of the various costs of the program. Due to the SYEP program in the years 2005 to 2008, the discounted value of the reduction in non-SYEP earnings is $99.8 million; the discounted administrative costs of SYEP are $50.4 million, and assuming such administrative costs are bought at roughly competitive prices, the opportunity cost of these expenses is likely to be in roughly the same range; the opportunity cost of time of SYEP participants is unknown, but theory tells us it should have been less than the discounted transfers to SYEP participants, or $186.0 million; and the deadweight cost of the taxes raised to fund SYEP is unknown but should equal the discounted accounting cost of SYEP, $236.4 million, multiplied by the marginal social cost of public funds.60 

What is clear, and what we can conclude from this exercise, is that while we cannot say with certainty whether SYEP’s benefits outweigh its costs, it is certainly the case that SYEP’s mortality benefits are very large, and that they have a strong potential to be pivotal in determining whether the program’s benefits outweigh its costs. As in any empirical setting, our estimates are local to the group examined — in our case, SYEP participants. Thus, for example, our estimates apply to New York City, while effects may be different in other cities. Despite this caveat, our results may have important implications for other efforts to improve youth employment outcomes, including the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, other cities’ summer employment programs, and other efforts to support summer youth employment.61 

Crucially, our results also demonstrate that effects on less-scrutinized outcomes such as mortality can be very important. Like most other studies of youth active labor market programs surveyed (Stanley, Katz, and Krueger 1998; Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999; Lalonde 2003; Card, Kluve, and Weber 2010), we find that SYEP did not increase future earnings and that earnings effects on their own could not justify the program’s costs in a cost-benefit analysis. This is certainly true in our context, where in fact we find that SYEP modestly reduces participants’ future earnings for three subsequent years. However, unlike other studies, we find a very large source of new benefits due to the program’s reduction in mortality, which has a strong potential to be pivotal in assessing whether the program’s benefits outweigh the costs. Other youth active labor market programs may or may not have such mortality benefits — data should be gathered to determine whether this is true — but it is worth noting that like SYEP, other youth programs have been found to keep youth out of trouble (for example, Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2008 find that Job Corps reduces crime, and Heller 2014 finds that the Chicago summer youth program reduces violent crime arrests). 

Our results also suggest that earnings crowdout may be minimized, and the reductions in mortality and incarceration can be maximized, by targeting such policies toward younger individuals, and/or those not previously working. Furthermore, the results show modest contemporaneous crowdout; if applicable in contexts such as the 2009 stimulus spending on summer youth employment, this suggests that summer youth employment spending increased net income, and net contemporaneous income and employment, of the youth employed through the program. 

As noted above, we do not observe the social or non-pecuniary benefits of jobs; it is possible that there are externalities or non-pecuniary benefits associated with the work for non-profit organizations that youth typically do through SYEP and in subsequent jobs. In that light, it is worth noting that SYEP modestly raises average subsequent earnings in jobs at non-profit employers, while modestly lowering subsequent earnings in jobs at for-profit employers and lowering earnings in jobs with the government. As in other studies using administrative data, we do not observe earnings in the underground economy. However, we believe it is unlikely that observing underground earnings would dramatically impact our results. (paper代写)

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