ASSISTING THE FIRST OFFICER MONITOR AND CHALLENGE CAPTAIN ERRORS--论文代写范文精选

我们证明任何缺乏监控和挑战性是由于已经有据可查的监测。米尔格拉姆实验简要描述,具体实验和权力结构之间的连接分析使用一个驾驶舱。下面的paper代写范文进行详述。

ABSTRACT 
In this article the authority system in the airplane cockpit is related to thirty year old authority studies of Stanley Milgram. Human errors made in the cockpit are found similar to those made in the authority experiments. It is argued that up to 20% of all airplane accidents may be preventable by optimizing the monitoring and challenging of captain errors by the first officer.

INTRODUCTION 
In a hierarchical organization, the boss's authority in the work function can be more or less absolute. In 1963, the eminent social psychologist Stanley Milgram measured the strength of the United States society authority. He found that it was about much stronger than expected - a psychology experimenter was able to make subjects carry out orders that led to the simulated injury and death of a confederate. Such strong authority tends to create situations in which errors made by authorities will not be corrected. In particular, this is the case in the airplane cockpit: a disproportionate number of accidents occur with the captain flying erroneously and the first officer failing to monitor and challenge the captain errors. We make the case that any lack of monitoring and challenging of the captain by the first officer is due to the already well documented difficulty of monitoring and challenging authority in our society. The Milgram experiments are described briefly, specific connections between the experiment and the authority structure in the airplane cockpits are made and using this frame work an accident is analyzed more closely using a cockpit voice recording. We make a numerical estimate of how often inadequate monitoring and challenging errors results in accidents. Finally, we suggest ways to achieve the proper amount of monitoring and challenging by use of a simple "monitoring and challenging optimization" technique during LOFT.

THE SOURCES OF THE CAPTAIN’S AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COCKPIT 
In a typical commercial airplane cockpit there is a captain, a first officer and sometimes a flight engineer. In this chapter we will limit ourselves to considering the relationship between the captain and the first officer. We begin by describing the many sources of the captain's authority. They include rules, different levels of flight experience, aviation tradition, military, corporate, and societal norms and values. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) states that a captain, nobody else, is the final authority on the airplane. The CFR sets differential requirements for captains and first officers. For a captain it requires about 1500 hours of flight time and for a first officer the requirement is only 200 hours of flight time. 

Once a first officer fulfills the CFR requirement to become a captain, he or she must also fulfill the captain requirements of the particular airline. Personnel policies provide additional thresholds for both overall flight hours and flight hours in the particular aircraft and the pilot also needs to have seniority on the airline's union list. It typically takes a decade or two to become a captain on a large airplane. In the NTSB’s accident sample (see below), captains had 3-4 times more experience than their first officers whether measured by the historical total flying time (median times of 14,000 vs. 5,100 hours) or the experience in the accident aircraft type (median times of 3300 vs. 880 hours). Aviation organizational norms include the individualistic thinking from the historical period of the single-pilot planes. This tradition devalues the first officer. Thus, the institution of the first officer is "not fully developed," and the latter plays a "distinctly secondary role". Indeed, "in 1952 the guidelines for proficiency checks at one major airline categorically stated that the first officer should not correct errors made by the captain" (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993, pp. 4-5). 

Military values enter commercial airlines when pilots who are military veterans enter the civilian workforce. These values include "respect for rank, for leaders who take charge and act decisively, and for subordinates who understand that it is usually not appropriate to question the decisions of their superiors” (Birnbach & Longridge, 1993, p. 265). Additionally, the values of a hierarchical corporate culture contribute to strong authority relationships. For example, in a New York Times article, the strength of the authority of the CEO of a particular airline was indicated by the CEO's staying power in conjunction with seemingly extreme incompetence. He would “doze off” in meetings and call the company officers, and even the airline, by the wrong name (Bryant, 1994, p. 17N). 

The captain's authority can be even stronger in other societies. Merritt and Helmreich (1996) found that the statement, “Senior staff deserves extra benefits and privileges,” elicited a neutral position to slight disagreement among American captains and first officers from four airlines, but those of a Brazilian airline agreed with it. The statement, “Crewmembers should not question the decisions or actions of the captain except when they threaten the safety of the flight,” elicited variations between 15 and 93% agreement among pilots in different countries, and the statement, “If I perceive a problem with the flight, I will speak up, regardless of who might be affected,” elicited variations between 36 and 98 % agreement. Finally, the statement, “The organization’s rules should not be broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interests,” elicited variations between 22 and 76 %. That these statements carry over to actual differences in behavior seems reasonable.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FINDINGS: THE DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING STRONG AUTHORITY 
Excessively obedient behavior in the presence of authority was found in the psychology laboratory by Stanley Milgram over thirty-five years ago (Milgram, 1974). In these experiments, a subject, the teacher, is asked by the experimenter to give electrical shocks to a confederate, the learner. The stated purpose of the experiment is to understand how punishment affects memory recall. The learner first fakes discomfort and as the fake electrical shocks increase to dangerous levels, he suddenly becomes quiet.

A CASE STUDY WITH A COCKPIT VOICE RECORDING
On December 1, 1993, Express II Airlines Inc. / Northwest Airlink Flight 5719 descended too quickly and crashed before it hit the runway in Hibbing, Minnesota. All sixteen people on board died. According to the NTSB (NTSB, 1994a) the crash was caused by several factors: the captain flew the airplane inappropriately; did not “exercise proper crew coordination”; the first officer did not properly monitor [Lack of Monitoring] and alert the captain of the problematic descent [Hesitant Challenging]; the captain intimidated his first officer; there was inadequate airline oversight of the captain, 8 who had a history of intimidating his first officers; and there was inadequate FAA surveillance of the airline. That the captain’s authority was strong in the cockpit can be deduced as follows. 

The captain intimidated five out of six first officers interviewed. He had actually struck one of them for mistakenly leaving the intercom on, and this fact had been passed on to the first officer of the accident flight. His first officers never reported the fact that the captain did not fly by the book, violated company policies on sexual harassment, sleeping in flight, and flying with mechanical irregularities. The first officer, on the other hand, was a new probationary employee who “had just spent $8,500 of his own money to be trained for a job that provided an annual earning potential of $18,000.” Such high stakes make it less likely that such a first officer would challenge a captain who could have a detrimental effect on his career. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript showed that “most of the captain’s communication with the first officer was either to correct him or to tell him what to do.” 

Other captains testified afterwards that the first officer had not needed these directions during their flights. Some of these instructions were even absurd. Further, according to the NTSB, “the statements of the first officer on the CVR suggest a tense and almost reserved attitude toward the captain [Excessive Obedience]. Information provided by the first officer to the captain was couched in a questioning manner rather than as an assertion.” [Hesitant Challenging]. Finally, the airline only provided a single approach chart, which both captain and first officer had to use.

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