Skills, routines and disciplined progress--论文代写范文

也许结果归因于这样一个事实，例程的讨论被广泛引用。个人技能的关系基于迈克尔·波拉尼的见解和其他的重复的个人表现。这些观点存在不同，对于令人印象深刻的锻炼。下面的essay代写范文进行论述。

  Tensions between short-run efficiency objectives and long-term innovation objectives are a fact of organizational life – a fact by now much remarked and carrying several labels. There is also, however, something in the way of a tool kit for dealing with these tensions – and again we have a choice of observers, theories and labels. On both sides of the question, complex causal mechanisms play out in diverse ways in diverse situations. This might imply that we should not be aspiring to general conclusions with respect to the overall question, but rather seeking to sort out the mechanisms and the contingencies. 

  Among the many tempting targets presented by this discussion, I choose to highlight ones that have deep and long-standing connections to my own work – considering that the obvious objections on grounds of ego-centricity are here outweighed by considerations of comparative advantage. I re-examine issues related to the discussion of organizational routines in my book with Nelson (Nelson and Winter, 1982), inter-weaving three major themes that offer discussion opportunities of the ‘‘compare and contrast’’ kind. These are (1) past to present, i.e., the origins of the ideas and what happened to them, (2) individuals to organizations, i.e., skills to routines and capabilities, and (3) stasis to change—which is (partly) aligned with ‘‘exploitation vs. exploration’’ and the other versions of the focal question here. 

  The picture of organizational routines that Nelson and I presented drew elements from several sources. In the book, the (organizational) routines chapter followed the (individual) skills chapter, and of course we had in mind that the former would be read in the light of the latter. In retrospect that seems to have been a naı¨ve expectation. Perhaps the result is partly attributable to the fact that the routines discussion became widely cited and this may have led people to dip into the book at Chapter 5. Certainly our discussion of routines was strongly grounded in the prior contributions of the Carnegie School and other scholars of organizations. In its relationship to individual skill, however, it was also grounded in the insights of Michael Polanyi (Polanyi, 1964) and other close observers of repetitive individual performance (e.g., Schank and Abelson, 1977). 

  These perspectives offer a different view of human possibilities than is suggested by the Carnegie term ‘‘bounded rationality.’’ When witnessing the exercise of impressively high skill, it is not so much the ‘‘boundedness’’ that seems salient, but the virtual impossibility of reconciling what is observed with an inner process that is subjectively familiar to the observer as a process of ‘‘choice,’’ ‘‘deliberation’’ or (conscious) ‘‘calculation.’’ It looks like the skilled performer is performing too well and too fast for that sort of thing to be going on. As it turns out, this judgment is basically correct. 

  Psychological research subsequent to 1982 confirmed the existence of a performance system that is grounded in procedural memory (a.k.a. ‘‘skill memory’’), a system that is physiologically distinct in the brain, and quasi-independent in function, from declarative memory and the slow processes guiding deliberate choice (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). Highly skilled performance is to a large extent ‘‘played’’ out of procedural memory, not ‘‘chosen’’ in detail, and it is available for playing by virtue of prior learning and practice. It contributes to creativity by limiting the scope of slow ‘‘choosing’’ to ‘‘what should be played now?’’ and ‘‘how can that last attempt be corrected or improved?’’ 

  The realized achievement depends on an indispensable time investment by the learner, which cannot be substituted by a virtually costless transfer of mere symbols. The investment is irreversible not only in the sense that the time investment cannot be recovered by ‘‘cashing in’’ the acquired skill, but also in the sense that the effect of learning is to create behavioral channels that are partly sub-conscious and typically difficult to resist or remove. Thus it happens that skilled performance is associated with a characteristic failure mode, ‘‘doing the wrong thing well,’’ that occurs when learned programs ‘‘fire’’ on inappropriate occasions (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). That similar mechanisms operate in the domain of perception has long been noticed, e.g., in Gestalt psychology, and has recently acquired additional confirmation the physiological level (Rizzolatti et al., 2008). 

  The recent psychological evidence vindicates the earlier judgments of Polanyi and many others (including followers such as NW), regarding the quasi-independent role of skill. Among those precursors, we would now cite an important one we previously neglected, Dewey (1922). Dewey saw human behavior as constituted by varying mixes of three components: habit (which reflects prior learning and thus encompasses skill), intelligence (or deliberation), and impulse (affect, or emotion). We know a great deal more about the physiological basis of these components than we did in Dewey’s day, and we know something about what happens when one or another of these components is severely impaired in an individual. His scheme stands as a call to action for today’s social scientists, challenging us in two ways: first, to develop a balanced view of the sources of behavior; second, to attend to the crucial but complex question of how the interfaces work when the components are jointly expressed in behavior (Cohen, 2006, 2007; Adler and Obstfeld, 2007). 

  Among the advantages of the conceptual juxtaposition of skills and routines is the evaluative tension induced by the terminology. It is easy to be ‘‘against routine’’ because the term has some negative connotations, but it is harder to be ‘‘against skill.’’3 Yet there are strong connections between the two levels, involving at least four important elements—logical isomorphisms between the choice problems facing the actors,4 causal reduction opportunities because of the role of individual skills in routines, causal relations in the opposite direction by virtue of the shaping of individuals by the social context, and fruitful analogies suggested by the perspective, ‘‘individuals are complex organizations too.’’ In that perspective, the conscious mind is in the role of top management, deliberating and setting directions, while innate or learned neuronal patterns do the implementation – often doing enormously complex things that the mind is not aware of and could not do itself. 

  The mind is, however, involved in important choices about which skills are worth acquiring, and in guiding the halting performances that ensue at the early stages of learning. The investment analytics relevant to those conscious activities of the individual are formally equivalent to those for top management decisions about strategic extension of capabilities, and the subsequent consequences that flow from the economic logic of sunk costs (e.g., competency traps) are also equivalent. Once the learning investment is made, it can be quite rational to continue exercising the acquired skill even in environments that would no longer justify the investment. (It ‘‘can,’’ but need not, of course.) （essay代写)

  Given these connections, it can be instructive to take an offered case ‘‘against routine,’’ find a parallel in the domain of individual skill and see how the argument sounds there. In my view, the parallel cases are easy to find and the reexamination tends to make the case against routine sound less persuasive.5 Take the issue of discipline, for example. At the individual level, we can identify cases where regimes of disciplined practice are a clearly-marked part of the path to innovation, creativity and general excellence: Prominent examples like gymnastics, musical performance or fluent command of a foreign language have innumerable counterparts in the specialized skills exercised in the workplace. It is true that creativity and even competence can be impaired if discipline is overdone. Also, there are certainly domains where brilliant ‘‘improvisation’’ is much admired, though close inspection often reveals a fundamental role for practice, and microrepetition, in improvised performance.6 These observa tions do not significantly qualify the typical foundational and enabling role of disciplined practice, considered as the basis of individual skill.（essay代写)

  51Due原创版权郑重声明：原创范文源自编辑创作，未经官方许可，网站谢绝转载。对于侵权行为，未经同意的情况下，51Due有权追究法律责任。
  51due为留学生提供最好的服务，想获取更多paper代写范文，亲们可以进入主页 www.51due.com  为留学生提供paper代写服务，了解详情可以咨询我们的客服QQ:800020041哟。

标签：论文代写  disciplined progress  代写  留学生作业代写