Politic and literature--论文代写范文精选

关键是涉及目标转移到特殊利益集团的政策，可能会赢得多数反对，政策涉及到高效的公共商品。下面的essay代写范文进行了叙述。

Abstract 
Our basic setup is taken from the normative literature that uses a mechanism design approach to study public goods provision, or income taxation. The main difference between our approach and this literature is that we replace the fictitious benevolent mechanism designer by the forces of political competition. The normative literature on public goods provision has, by and large, focussed on the question whether surplus-maximizing outcomes can be obtained if incentive compatibility and/or participation constraints have to be respected.3 We do not impose participation constraints in our analysis. We take it as given that the government uses its coercive power to finance publicly provided goods. 

The literature on optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971) has analyzed the conditions under which a welfaremaximizing policy involves distortionary taxes.4 Some authors have related the mechanism design approach to public-goods provision to the institutional arrangements of a direct democracy.5 Our approach is different in that we focus on a representative democracy. Citizens in our framework vote for politicians, and not over policies. Lizzeri and Persico (2001; 2004; 2005) and Roberson (2008) study political competition under the assumption that a policy proposal involves the provision of a public good and distribution of favors in the electorate. A key insight is that a policy that involves targeted transfers to special interests may win a majority against a policy that involves efficient public goods provision.6

These papers invoke the assumption that the benefits from public goods provision are common knowledge. Hence, there is no requirement of incentive compatibility. We will demonstrate in Section 3 that privacy of information makes i t more difficult to form a majority that votes against efficient public-goods provision. Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) are classics on the political economy of redistributive income taxation. These papers restricts attention to affine income tax schedules, so that preferences are single-peaked and the median voter theorem applies.7 R¨oell (2012), and Brett and Weymark (2014) study the implications of the citizencandidate-model (see Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) for Mirrleesian income taxation. Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) and Bierbrauer and Boyer (2013) study competition between vote-share-maximizing politicians in a simple Mirrlees-model with only two types of individuals, rich and poor.8 There also is a literature on the political economy of taxation and public spending in dynamic models. 

A variety of political economy models has been explored by this literature.9 However, to the best of our knowledge, there is not yet an analysis of Downsian competition. Finally, our work is related to the game-theoretic literature on the “divide-the-dollargame”. These are models of political competition in which a policy proposal specifies how a cake of a given size should be distributed among voters.10 Our model differs in that policy proposals affect the size of the cake that is available for redistribution. Also, there is private information on preferences so that not only resource constraints but also incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. Still our equilibrium characterization makes use of insights which have been provided by this literature, in particular, by Myerson (1993).（essay代写)

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