Irrelevances to the debate--论文代写范文精选

人工的情况下可以归类为确定性或其他 因素。例如在一个游戏中，你的下一步可能是由规则决定。框架内考虑问题,要么是有一种机制来确定，没有足够的信息来确定任何过)。下面的essay代写范文进行详述。

Abstract
Associated with the debate on the absolute question, but not central to it, are a host of oldchestnuts that have not been shown to be relevant, but are often assumed to be crucial. There is not space to deal with them all or thoroughly enough to convince a believer of their inadequacy, but I list some of the more frequent of them below. Despite their weakness to determine the absolute question, they each have strong practical consequences.

Determinism 
Whether natural systems are deterministic or not, in an absolute sense, seems to be an untestable question. Both the deterministic and indeterministic viewpoints adequately describe the observed world. Thus the abstract question of whether a real system is deterministic must be irrelevant to the abstract question of the validity of the reductionist thesis7 . Artificial situations can be categorised as deterministic or otherwise. For example in a game your next move may be determined by the rules or you may have a choice. Within the framework you are considering, there is either a mechanism for determining your move (i.e. the player’s strategy for the game) or not. If there is, then the move is determined by that, if not, it is undetermined - i.e. there is simply not enough information to determine this by any process (mechanical or otherwise). Note that whether the move is determined does depend on the framework you are considering, but within any particular framework (however general), whether something is determined is not relevant to the absolute question of whether the situation is reducible or not. However, this does highlight the practical importance of choosing the appropriate framework for a problem. The framework greatly effects the practicality of modelling a system. In the above example in a framework which includes the players strategies, it may be possible to model the game but impractical if you choose merely the rules and possible sequences of moves.

Analogue vs. digital There is a basic difference between what can be theoretically modelled using analogue and formalisms8 . Sometimes this is on the grounds of the importance of noise. There is an essential difference between analogue and digital in the abstract. You can not encode all analogue values as digital, only some of them. This can be proved with a classical diagonal argument. This means that literally we can not talk about most analogue values, except as a collective abstraction (“let x be a real number...”), as there are no finite descriptions of them. 

The digital and analogue can arbitrarily approximate each other, thus the colour of a pixel on a VDU is composed of different wavelengths (analogue), which is encoded by the computer as a binary number (digital), which is encoded as voltages in circuits (analogue), which correspond to energy levels (digital). The natural world may, at root, be analogue or digital, we do not know9. Even with matter and energy one could argue that the quanta are a result of observing a continuous wave function. Thus arguments which rely on a fundamental difference between the analogue nature of reality and the digital nature of formalisms and the modern computer, must be somewhat arbitrary. This is not to say that either simulating the analogue by the digital (or visca versa) does not present considerable practical difficulties.

Ability to modify hardware The ability of an organism to modify its own “hardware”, for example when a protein acts on its own DNA (e.g. to repair it), or at least acts to effect the interpretation of that DNA into proteins, is sometimes compared to a Turing machine which cannot directly effect its “hardware” (as usually defined). This separation of hardware and software is arbitrary unless “physicality” can be shown to be important attribute, effecting what can be computed. Otherwise, there is nothing to stop a Turing machine simulating such a change in hardware (including its own). For example, imagine a Turing machine which could execute an instruction-type that could change one of its own instructions. It would seem at first glance that this new machine “goes beyond” the usual version, but this is not so. A normal Turing machine can compute exactly the same functions as the new enhanced machine, because although it cannot change its own instructions, those simple instructions can be combined in a sophisticated way to simulate the computation of the enhanced machine.

Noise and randomness 
Noise is a random input into a system’s processes. Such randomness can be defined in several ways. It can be any sufficiently variable data which originates from outside the scope of a system’s model of its world, and is thus unpredictable. It can be data which passes a series of statistical tests. It can be a pattern which is incompressible by a Turing machine. In any case there are fully deterministic processes which produce sequences that are practically indistinguishable from random ones from any particular system’s point of view. Thus a system with noise can be simulated by a model with the addition of such a process, such that the system does not have full access to the workings of that process. In the opposite direction a noiseless system can be arbitrarily approximated by one that has noise, by suitable redundancy in its construction. This is how we maintain information in digital computers and our own genome.

Particular formal languages (2-valued logic) 
One particular bugbear of holists, is classical two-valued logic. This is criticised as not being expressive enough to capture all the meaning orreasoning necessary to model some systems. Sometimes it is Zermelo-Frankel set-theory that is the target. For example Rosen [14] suggests a approach to modelling in terms of category theory as a possible way forward in modelling complex biological systems. Often it seems that the importance of whether a formal system is applicable is based on a shallow reading of the formal system’s immediate properties and passes-over what further expressive features can be formalised within it. In fact the choice of formal system is not critical in absolute terms, as long as the system is expressive enough. For example category theory and set theory can both be used to formalise the other [12], similarly Classical first order logic can be used to formalise almost any other logic [6]. So there is no fundamental absolute grounds for preferring one such formal system to an other10.

Self-reference 
Another way in which holists claim that there are systems that are absolutely unamenable to formalisation is by exhibiting those that involve some form of self-reference. An example of this is found in [9]. There are two different forms of self-reference total and grounded. Total self-reference is completely self defining, if you follow the causal (or formal) chain backwards, you do not come to a fixed atomic starting place, but find an infinite recursion of definition in terms of itself. Grounded self-reference starts at a specific place (i.e. state or set of axioms), and then the next state is defined in terms of the last state etc. so after a while the current state is almost completely defined in terms of itself and the origin is lost for all practical purposes. 

Most examples of self-reference in the natural world would seem to be cases of grounded selfreference: life itself presumably started from some point, which arose from non-living state11; language is ultimately grounded in our shared experience, either directly as a child learns its first language, or indirectly in the evolution of language in our species12; even the universe itself seems to have passed through an initial equilibrial stage [21]. It would seem that total self-reference is difficult to embed in a traditional formalisation13, if only because in formalising something you need somewhere to start from. It is possible to dissect such a system so that it is representable within a traditional framework (e.g. the technique described in [9]), but only by effectively grounding it. Thus even if total self-referential formal systems exist they are only usable in modelling and easily communicable if grounded.

Grounded self-reference is formalisable by traditional formal systems, even though in some cases this may be a cumbersome and “unnatural” way to proceed. It is true that some such formalisations are either resistant, or do no have, analytic solutions that allow effective prediction of future (or even description of past) behaviour, but this has always been true of even the most classical of formalisms and thus is not relevant to the absolute reductionist/holist question. Again whether we use traditional styled or (grounded) self-referential systems for modelling, relates not to abstract but pragmatic considerations.

Simultaneity In most existing computation devices, computation proceeds sequentially. Even parallel devices are usually arranged so that their computations are equivalent to such a sequential approach. Likewise in almost all formal systems, facts are derived via an essentially sequential proof. Even when the proof is not sequential in nature, its verification is. Natural systems, however, seem to work in parallel. Von Foerster gives an example of a box with many block magnets in it14, the box is shaken and when opened they are arranged in a very nonrandom way, resulting in an attractive sculpture to an exterior observer. The two views of the box, internal and external are simultaneous and different. It is claimed that such simultaneous and (in some cases) irreconcilable viewpoints, mean that a single consistent formalism of a meta-model incorporating both viewpoints is impossible. If you have a parallel system there will be either some conflict avoidance or a conflict resolution mechanism (where by “conflicting” I mean exclusive). Of course, it is quite possible to have cases where (as in the above box of magnets example) there are views that appear to be conflicting, but you won’t have conflicts within the same context, this is impossible if a consistent language is used. Here it is not the simultaneity that is the problem but the reconciliation (or lack of it) of the same thing from within different frameworks (see Section 3.4 below). On the other hand, the difficulties of reconciling different simulataneous streams means that often the only practical option is to accept such different views as complementary.

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